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Abstract
This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between oﬃce-
holder and the electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the oﬃce-
holder’s ability. If oﬃce-holder eﬀort and ability interact in the determination of
performance in oﬃc e ,t h e na no ﬃce-holder has an incentive to learn i.e. raise
eﬀort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections
reduce the learning eﬀe c t ,a n dt h er e d u c t i o ni nt h i se ﬀect may more than oﬀset the
positive “career concerns” eﬀect of elections on eﬀort. Moreover, when this occurs,
appointment of oﬃcials may welfare-dominate elections.
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In recent years, economists and political scientists have applied principal-agent theory
to study the relationship between voters and elected oﬃcials. An early and important
contribution is by Ferejohn (1986), who assumed a pure moral hazard (hidden action)
problem between voters and the incumbent: the incumbent can improve the outcome
for the voters by exerting higher eﬀort, but such eﬀort is costly and observable, or at
least non-contractible. He also supposed that the voters could commit to a retrospective
voting strategy of voting the incumbent out if his performance was below some cutoﬀ
level. In this setting, the incumbent has a dynamic incentive to provide eﬀort in order to
get re-elected, but a static incentive to minimize eﬀort, implying a maximum incentive-
compatible level of eﬀort. If voters can coordinate, they can set the cutoﬀ to induce the
incumbent to provide this maximum. So, in Ferejohn’s model, electoral discipline clearly
motivates the incumbent.
This paper has stimulated an extensive literature. For example, Persson, Roland and
Tabellini (1997) build on this basic model, in combination with the legislative bargaining
model of Baron and Ferejohn (1989) in their inﬂuential analysis of presidential and par-
liamentary regimes. Many other applications of the basic Ferejohn model can be found
in the book by Persson and Tabellini (2000). More recently, Aidt and Magris (2003)
show how the dynamic incentives provided by retrospective voting can partially solve the
well-known “capital levy” problem.
The theme of this literature is that elections play a positive role in mitigating the moral
hazard problem between incumbents and voters, by inducing them to supply more eﬀort,
or to divert less rent to their own pocket, than they would in the absence of elections.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that in an environment with both moral
hazard and symmetric but incomplete information about the ability of the incumbent1,
elections do not always have this motivating feature. Moreover, our paper is the ﬁrst2,
to our knowledge, to explore the implications of this information structure in a model of
interaction between voters and incumbents.
Our setting is very simple. A committee (or electorate) has to select a representative
1That is, initially, both (poetitial) incumbents and voters are uncertain about the ability of potential
incumbents.
2The only possible exception (to our knowledge) is the career concerns model of Chapter 4.5 of Persson
and Tabellini (2000). However, in that model, there is no noise in the function mapping ability and eﬀort
to performance, so that incumbents can perfectly observe their ability from performance at the end of
the ﬁr s tp e r i o do fo ﬃce, and consequently, there is no learning eﬀect.
2to undertake a binary project in each of two periods. All members of the committee
care equally about the outcome, preferring success to failure. The probability of success
depends on the eﬀort exerted by the incumbent representative, times an ability parameter.
As argued below, the eﬀort variable can also be interpreted as a decision of how much
rent to divert from a budget which funds the project. Initially, all agents have the same
prior beliefs about their own ability and that of others. Eﬀort is costly (and unobservable
by all other members of the committee), but the incumbent is rewarded by either some
material beneﬁtf r o mo ﬃce, or some psychological ego-rent. When there is no uncertainty
about ability, our model is simply a special case of Ferejohn’s.
In this setting, we consider two institutional arrangements. The ﬁrst, appointment,
does not allow for any replacement of the initial incumbent. The second, election, allows
selection of a challenger to contest an election with the incumbent at the beginning of
the second period. All members of the committee vote, and the winner takes oﬃce in the
second period.
We show that in equilibrium, elections may demotivate: that is, the incumbent will
supply less eﬀort than with appointment. The intuition is the following. When ability
and eﬀort of the oﬃce-holder interact positively, the oﬃce-holder can learn more about
his ability by supplying more eﬀort. We call this the learning motive for supplying eﬀort.
However, if he is exposed to the possible future loss of oﬃce, his motive to learn will be
lessened. This diminution in the learning motive may more than oﬀset the increase in
eﬀort induced by the desire to win the election (the career concerns eﬀect). In this event,
the agent will supply less eﬀort than he would were he simply permanently appointed to
the job3.
We also study the welfare properties of the two institutional forms. First, we show
that if eﬀort is higher with elections, then voter4 utility will be higher. This is because
relative to appointment (in the terminology of Besley and Smart, 2003) elections have
both incentive and selection eﬀects. The selection eﬀect allows the replacement of an
incompetent candidate (as revealed by a failed project) and thus always increases voter
utility. So, if the incentive eﬀect of elections on eﬀort is also higher, then voters will gain
overall.
So, a necessary condition for appointment to yield higher voter utility is that eﬀort is
3One way of interpreting the diminution is as short-termism; the incumbent underinvests, in infor-
mation acquisition, anticipating he will lose power (see also Besley and Coate, 1998, for examples of this
type).
4We focus on the utility of the members of the committee other than the incumbent and challenger.
Analyisis of the welfare levels of the latter is more complex.
3higher under appointment than under elections in order to oﬀset the selection eﬀect. We
also show via numerical example that eﬀort can be suﬃciently higher under appointment
to make voter utility higher with appointment than with elections. In the wider literature
on incentive eﬀects of elections, this kind of ﬁnding is not new. For example, in the
model of Rogoﬀ (1990), where there is an adverse selection problem between voters and
politicians (i.e., politicians know their competency but voters do not) then it may be better
to abolish elections. The intuition there is that elections induce distortive signalling in
ﬁscal policy, which must be weighed against a positive selection eﬀect. However, our
welfare result is new, as far as we know, in the class of models that study a moral hazard
problem between voters and politicians.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
Section 3 presents the basic results on eﬀort levels. Section 4 is devoted to normative




There are two periods t =1 ,2, and a set of agents is N = {1,n}, with n ≥ 4. There is an
oﬃce or post to which one of the n agents can be appointed or elected in either period.
The responsibility of the oﬃce-holder (incumbent) at period t is to implement a discrete
project. The outcome is xt, where xt =0 ,1 denotes failure and success respectively. If
the incumbent is i ∈ N, the probability of success in either time period is pt = θ
iet, where
et ∈ [0,1] denotes eﬀort, and θ
i measures ability, with θ
i ∈ {θl,θ h}, 0 ≤ θl ≤ θh ≤ 1.
Initially, all agents believe that θ
1,..θ
n are independent draws from the same distribution,
where Pr(θ
i = θh)=π.
Every agent values a successful project at 1, and an unsuccessful one at 0. If no project
is implemented, all agents, including the incumbent, get zero. The cost of eﬀort for the
incumbent is c(e), with c increasing, strictly convex and5 c0(0) = c(0) = 0. The incumbent
is motivated to hold oﬃce, in spite of the cost of eﬀort, by a rent R from oﬃce. This may
be psychological (e.g., an “ego rent” as in Rogoﬀ, 1990), or capture some material beneﬁt
from oﬃce. [For example, heads of departments are often rewarded by lower teaching
loads.]
We consider two possible institutional forms in this paper:
5This condition ensures that the constraint e ≥ 0 is never binding in equilibrium.
4Appointment - At the beginning of t =1 , an agent i is drawn at random from N,a n d
instructed to implement the project in both periods.
Election -a na g e n ti is drawn at random from N, and instructed to implement the
project in period 1. At the beginning of period 2, an agent j is randomly selected from
N/{i}. Incumbent i and challenger j then simultaneously decide whether or not to stand
for election. All agents then vote on i vs. j, (if both stand) or one candidate vs the status
quo (if one stands). Otherwise, the status quo is implemented. All agents vote having
observed the outcome of the project at t =1 . If at least one candidate stands, the winner
is instructed to implement the project in period 2.
2.2. Discussion
Some comments are in order here. First, it should be noted that the eﬀort decision can
also be interpreted as a decision of how much rent to divert from a budget which ﬁnances
the project. Interpret e as the amount of money (or more generally, some purchased
input) actually spent on the project by the incumbent. Also, suppose that the available
budget for the project is normalized to unity. So, the rent diverted by the incumbent is
r =1−e. Then c(1−r)=u(r) can be interpreted as the utility of rent for the incumbent.
The assumptions on c imply that u is increasing and concave.
Second, the only diﬀerence between the two institutional forms6 is that appointment
does not allow any mechanism for replacement of the incumbent, whereas election does.
So, one way of thinking of appointment is that it involves a precommitment not to replace
the appointee.
Third, this model nests the pure moral hazard model of the Ferejohn(1986) type as a
special case. To see this, set θh = θl =1so that there is nothing to be learnt about ability.
Then, with appointment, the incumbent sets eﬀort level in both periods to equate the
incremental probability of success from higher eﬀort, 1, equal to the cost i.e. c0(eA)=1 .
With elections, there is an equilibrium where the incumbent makes a higher eﬀort than
eA in the ﬁrst period (say eE), enforced by the threat of losing oﬃce if the project is a
failure. In this equilibrium, the incremental cost of eﬀort is equated to one plus the net
ego-rent from retaining oﬃce next period i.e. c0(eE)=1+δ(R−c(eA)). As R−c(eA) > 0
-o t h e r w i s e ,t h ei n c u m b e n tw o u l dn o tw a n tt ot a k eo ﬃce, even if he wins the election -
6The “election” institutional form is not a full description of what happens with elections, as it does
not fully model candidate entry. However, we do ensure that the incumbent and challenger both have
the option of not standing for election, and so a basic individual rationality constraint, that no-one can
be forced to stand, is respected. The case of fully endogenous candidate entry is discussed in Section 4.
5eE >e A. This is not, however, the only equilibrium, as at the time of election, voters are
indiﬀerent between the incumbent and challenger7. In what follows, we abstract from this
special case by assuming θh >θ l, thus creating a learning motive. As we will see, this
multiplicity problem does not arise in the model with learning.
Finally, on the interpretation of the model. This simple set-up is designed to capture a
number of situations where a committee or electorate must make decisions. A key feature
of the model is that the incumbent cares about the outcome of the project - in fact, he
cares as much as the rest of the electorate, although this is not essential. If the incumbent
did not care at all, would anticipate supplying zero eﬀort in the second period under either
institutional form, and so have no incentive to learn about his ability in the ﬁrst period.
Thus, the model is in the “citizen-candidate” tradition of Besley and Coate (1997) and
Osborne and Slivinski (1996) rather than the type of model where the incumbent is solely
motivated by ego-rent or monetary gain.
3. Analysis
3.1. The Second Period
The analysis of this period is the same whether the institution is appointment or elections.
Let π2 be the belief on the part of the incumbent that he is high-ability at the end of
t =1 .H ec h o o s e se to maximize
[π2θh +( 1− π2)θl]e + R − c(e)
So, e solves
π2θh +( 1− π2)θl = c
0(e) (3.1)
Let this value of e be e(π2). From (3.1), we see that e0(π2)=( θh − θl)/c00 > 0. So,
second-period eﬀort under either institutional form is e2 = e(π2). Also deﬁne
v(π2)=[ π2θh +( 1− π2)θl]e(π2) − c(e(π2)) (3.2)
to be second-period utility of the incumbent, excluding any ego-rent. Note from (3.2)
that v is strictly increasing and convex in π1;
v
0(π2)=( θh − θl)e(π2) > 0, v
00(π2)=( θh − θl)e
0(π2) > 0
7For example, there is also an equilibrium where the voters always re-elect the incumbent, and so he
puts in eﬀort eA in the ﬁrst period, as well as the second. But, there cannot be an equilibrium where the
incumbent puts in lower eﬀort with election than with appointment.
6These properties imply (as we shall see) that information about θ obtained by Bayesian
updating is strictly valuable.
3.2. Bayesian Updating and the Value of Information
Generally, the incumbent’s posterior π2 will depend on (i) the success or failure of the
project at t =1 ;(ii) the eﬀort made at t =1 . So, we will write π2(x1,e 1). By Bayes’ rule:
π2(1,e 1)=
πθhe1
πθhe1 +( 1− π)θle1
; π2(0,e 1)=
π(1 − θhe1)
π(1 − θhe1)+( 1− π)(1 − θle1)
where π is the prior belief that ability is high. Note that π2(1,e 1) is in fact independent
of e1,i . e .
π2(1,e 1)=π2(1) =
πθh
πθh +( 1− π)θl
but π2(0,e 1) is decreasing8 in e1. Finally, note that the expected second-period payoﬀ to
the incumbent can be written
V (e1)=Ev(e1)=v(π2(1,e 1))θe1 + v(π2(0,e 1))(1 − θe1) (3.3)
where θ = πθh +( 1− π)θl. and Pr(x1 =1 )=θe1.S oa ni n c r e a s ei ne1 will increase the
information contained in the observation of the project outcome x1, and thus increase
second-period expected utility (the learning eﬀect). Formally, V 0(e1) > 0. This learning
eﬀect can be shown diagrammatically, where in the diagram, we have used the fact that
by construction,
π2(1,e 1)Pr(x1 =1 )+π2(0,e 1)Pr(x1 =0 )=π
i.e., the posteriors weighted by the probability of success equal the prior.
Figure 1 in here





π(1 − π)(θh − θl)
(1 − θe1)2 < 0
where θ = πθh +( 1− π)θl.
73.3. The First Period: Appointment
The expected payoﬀ to the appointee in period 1 is
θe1 + R − c(e1)+δ(V (e1)+R) (3.4)
The optimal choice of e1, denoted eA
1 , maximises (3.4) subject to e1 ∈ [0,1]. Assuming an
interior solution, i.e., eA




The ﬁrst term θ−c0(e1) on the left-hand side is the ﬁrst-period (myopic) gain from a small
increase in eﬀort. The second term V 0(e1) is the learning eﬀect. As the learning eﬀect is
strictly positive, eA
1 >e ∗, where e∗ < 1 is the myopic eﬀort level that solves θ = c0(e∗).
Finally, for future reference, the learning eﬀect can be calculated as
V




(1 − θe1) (3.6)
T og e tf u r t h e ri n s i g h ti n t ot h es i z eo ft h el e a r n i n ge ﬀect, assume that c(e)=e2
2 . Then,




1 = θ + δ
π2(1 − π)2(θh − θl)4
2θ(1 − θeA
1 )2 (3.7)
so that the second term on the right of (3.7) is the learning eﬀect V 0(e1). Other things
equal, it is larger (i) the larger the initial uncertainty about the ability parameter, as
measured by θh − θl; (ii) the closer π is to 0.5, i.e., the more “uniform” the prior.
3.4. The First Period: Elections
We solve backwards. Consider the second period where i and j are candidates. First,
if the incumbent stands and wins, his payoﬀ is v(π2(x1,e 1)) +R, while all other agents
get w(π2(x1,e 1)), where w(π)=[ πθh +( 1− π)θl]e2(π) is simply the probability that the
project will be a success in the second period, given belief π. Second, if the challenger
stands for election and wins, his payoﬀ is v(π)+R, while all other agents get w(π). If
the status quo wins, or nobody challenges, everybody gets 0. Given these payoﬀs, and
noting that w(π) > 0,w h a t e v e rπ, and π2(1) >π>v (π2(0,e 1)), for all e1 ∈ [0,1], all
agents other than i,j have the following unique weakly undominated voting strategies:
(i) if i,j both stand, vote for the incumbent (challenger) if x1 =1(x1 =0 ) ; (ii) if only
one candidate stands, vote for that candidate. We will assume that all agents other than
8i,j play these strategies. On the other hand, whenever i or j wish to stand, their unique
weakly undominated strategy is to vote for themselves. So, as n ≥ 4, the voting behavior
of those not standing for election determines the outcome9.
So, given this outcome, the simultaneous choice of whether to stand or not for election
reduces to the following 2 × 2 matrix game, where S denotes the decision to stand, and
N the decision not to stand, and the incumbent (challenger) chooses rows (columns):
i/j S N
S a,b v(π2(x1,e 1)) + R, w(π2(x1,e 1))




v(π2(1,e 1)) + R if x1 =1
w(π) if x1 =0
,b =
(
w(π2(1,e 1)) if x1 =1
v(π)+R if x1 =0
The following Lemma characterizes the possible weakly undominated Nash equilibria of
this game. The proof is straightforward and is omitted.
Lemma. Whatever x1, there is (generically) exactly one undominated Nash equilibrium
in the above game. Assume x1 =1 . Then, if v(π2(1))+R>w (π), it is S,S. If v(π2(1))+
R<w (π), it is N,S. If v(π2(1)) + R = w(π), both S,S and N,S are possible. Assume
x1 =0 . Then, if v(π)+R>w (π2(0,e 1)), it is S,S. If v(π)+R<w (π2(0,e 1)), it is S,N.
If v(π)+R = w(π2(0,e 1)), both S,S and S,N are possible.
It is sensible to focus on continuation equilibria where the both candidates contest the
election, i.e., the outcome is S,S. The other continuation equilibria are possible, i.e., there
are parameter values where they can arise, but they are rather perverse. For example, if
v(π2(1)) + R<w (π), the incumbent does not stand if the project is a success. So, from
the Lemma, and R ≥ 0, need to we assume that:
A1. R>max{−∆I,−∆C,0}
where
∆I = v(π2(1)) − w(π), ∆C = v(π) − w(π2(0,e 1))
are the gains to standing for oﬃce for incumbent and challenger respectively, excluding
any ego-rent, given (i) that the incumbent (resp. challenger) wins; (ii) the other agent
9Note that unlike in the Ferejohn model, Nash equilibrium in voting strategies is unique, given the
rather weak requirement that the Nash equilibrium be weakly undominated. So, our results do not require
picking one favourable equilibrium at the voting stage.
9also stands for oﬃce. This constraint has an intuitive interpretation. First, it implies
v(π2(1)) + R>w (π), so the incumbent must strictly prefer to take oﬃce rather than be
replaced by the challenger in the event that the project is a success. Second, v(π)+R>
w(π2(0,e 1)), so the challenger must strictly prefer to take oﬃce rather than be replaced
by the incumbent in the event that the project is a failure.
So, if the project is a success, the incumbent gets v(π2(1)) + R, a n di fi ti saf a i l u r e ,
the incumbent gets w(π). So, the expected second-period payoﬀ of the incumbent is
VE(e1)=[ v(π2(1)) + R]θe1 + w(π)(1 − θe1)
So, the expected payoﬀ in period 1 is
θe1 − c(e1)+R + δVE(e1) (3.8)
The optimal choice of e1, denoted eE
1 , maximises (3.8) subject to e1 ∈ [0,1]. Assuming an
interior solution, the FOC for e1 is:
θ − c
0(e1)+δθ[∆I + R]=0 (3.9)
There is now no learning eﬀect: the term in ∆I +R is the electoral incentive for winning
oﬃce for the incumbent and is positive by A1.
3.5. Comparing Appointment and Elections
We can now turn to the main topic of the paper, the comparison of eﬀort levels under
appointment and democracy. In the ﬁnal period, conditional on posterior belief about
type, the same (ineﬃciently low) eﬀort level e(π2) occurs under both institutions. The
interesting comparison is therefore in the ﬁrst period. By inspection of (3.5), (3.9), we
see that the dynamic eﬀort incentive under appointment, relative to that under election,
is V 0(e1) − θ[∆I + R]. Now, from A1,
∆I + R>max{0,∆I − ∆C,∆I}
So, it is clear that if ∆I ≤ min{0, ∆C} the electoral incentive ∆I + R can be made
arbitrarily small subject to A1 being satisﬁed by appropriate choice of R.B u t t h e n a s
V 0(e1) is bounded above zero on [0,1],Rc a na l w a y sb ec h o s e nt om a k eeA
1 >e E
1 , because
V 0(e1) is independent of R.
Moreover, it is possible to choose parameter values such that ∆I ≤ min{0, ∆C}. For
example, it is shown in the Appendix that if costs are quadratic, i.e., c = e2
2 , and π =
101/
√






2 − 1) ' 0.91, then this condition is satisﬁed. So, to
conclude, in the quadratic cost case, there are certainly parameter values for which ∆I ≤
min{0, ∆C}. We have thus proved:
Proposition 1. If ∆I ≤ min{0, ∆C}, then an R satisfying A1 can be found for which
eA
1 >e E
1 . Moreover, if the cost of eﬀort is quadratic, parameter values can be chosen so
that ∆I ≤ min{0, ∆C}.
Thus, we have the possibility that elections can demotivate. This is the key result of
the paper.
Table 1 below illustrates this result with some numerical simulations with a quadratic
cost-of-eﬀort function. In particular it shows how much higher eA
1 can be compared to eE
1 .
As can be seen, the diﬀerence can be fairly signiﬁcant (e.g., in the ﬁrst row, eA
1 is shown
to be ten percent larger than eE
1 ). The table also shows the eﬀect of some comparative
statics on eﬀort levels (i.e., changes in the ability spread, changes in the ego rent from
oﬃce, changes in the prior belief regarding ability). ∆I and ∆C are also reported to
conﬁrm that A1 is satisﬁed in all cases, and also the myopic eﬀort level e∗ is reported.
Finally, in the last column, expected voter utilities are presented: these are discussed in
the next section.





1 −∆I, −∆C e∗ UA,U E
θh =0 .99,θ l =0 ,π= 1 √
2,R=0 .15 0.878, 0.794 −0.32, −0.22 0.700 1.18, 1.24
θh =0 .99,θ l =0 ,π= 1 √
2,R=0 .005 0.878, 0.703 −0.25, −0.04 0.700 1.18, 1.15
θh =0 .92,θ l =0 ,π= 1 √
2,R=0 .15 0.727, 0.738 −0.30, −0.15 0.650 0.91, 1.04
θh =0 .92,θ l =0 ,π= 1 √
2,R=0 .005 0.727, 0.653 −0.21, −0.01 0.650 0.91, 0.97
θh =0 .99,θ l =0 ,π=0 .9,R=0 .15 0.606, 0.670 −066, −0.19 0.495 0.61, 0.77
θh =0 .99,θ l =0 ,π=0 .9,R=0 .005 0.606, 0.606 −0.55, −0.04 0.495 0.61, 0.72
[δ =0 .9 in all cases]
114. Welfare Analysis
Consider the expected payoﬀ t oav o t e rw h oi sn o ts e l e c t e df o ro ﬃce in either period under














1 w(π2(1)) + (1 − θe
E
1 )w(π)] (4.2)
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W(e)=θew(π2(1)) + (1 − θe)w(π2(0,e))
and recalling that w(π)=( πθh +( 1− π)θl)e(π). Now, note that by deﬁnition,
w
0(π)=( θh − θl)e(π)+( πθh +( 1− π)θl)e
0(π) > 0
w
00(π)=2 ( θh − θl)e
0(π)+( πθh +( 1− π)θl)e
00(π)
So, if e00(π) ≥ 0, then w00(π) > 0, and then W0(e) b yt h es a m ea r g u m e n tt h a te s t a b l i s h e d
V 0(e) > 0 above.
Now, we can write the gain to election over appointment as
























The gain to democracy over appointment thus decomposes neatly into three diﬀerent ef-
fects. The ﬁrst, θ(eE
1 −eA
1 ), is the ﬁrst-period beneﬁtf r o mh i g h e re ﬀort (this of course may
be negative, if eE
1 <e A
1 ). The second is the learning eﬀect from higher eﬀort which (as-
suming e00(π) ≥ 0) again is positive if eE
1 >e A
1 , as W is increasing in e. In the terminology
of Besley and Smart (2003), these two eﬀects are both incentive eﬀects of elections. The
third is the selection eﬀect of elections, and is always positive as w(π) >w (π2(0,e E
1 )). It
captures the fact that democracy allows de-selection of incompetent incumbents.
From the deﬁnition of ∆, and this discussion, the following result follows immediately:
Proposition 2. Assume e00(π) ≥ 0. If eE
1 ≥ eA
1 , then democracy welfare-dominates
appointment, i.e., UE >U A.
This is because the incentive and selection eﬀects work in the same direction. So,
a necessary condition for appointment to dominate is that eE
1 <e A
1 . Table 1 presented
12above, shows that, in the case of a quadratic cost-of-eﬀort function, UE <U A is indeed
possible. The table also reports eE
1 ,e A
1 and it can be conﬁrmed that eE
1 <e A
1 is indeed
required, but not suﬃcient, for UE <U A.
Finally, note that e00(π) ≥ 0 is not a strong assumption. It is satisﬁed for example, by
c(e)= 1
αeα, all 1 <α≤ 2, which includes the quadratic.
5. Some Extensions
5.1. Endogenous Candidate Entry
It is possible to write down a version of the model with fully endogenous candidate entry
where the above conclusions are substantially unchanged. Suppose for simplicity that
only two members of the committee, 1 and 2, are competent to hold oﬃce. Then, at the
beginning of each period, both simultaneously decide whether to stand or not: standing
for oﬃce is costless. If no-one stands, or a single candidate for oﬃce is defeated in favour
of the status quo, then the status quo is implemented. Then, the analysis of Section
3.4 above applies exactly from the point where a ﬁrst-period incumbent is elected. With
endogenous entry, the only change is that, given the restrictions on electoral incentives
required to show that eA
1 >e E
1 , it may be that at the beginning of t =1 , each of the two
potential candidates may prefer the other to stand for oﬃce. But, under the assumptions
made so far, each would prefer to take oﬃce at t =1rather than have the status quo
implemented. In this case, each will randomize over the entry decision, implying a further
source of ineﬃciency with elections; the project may not be implemented with some
probability.
5.2. Many Project Outcomes
One simplifying assumption of the model is that the project outcome is binary, i.e.,
xt ∈ {0,1}. In Le Borgne and Lockwood (2000), the more general case where xt is a real
number is studied: this paper also allows for a wider class of interactions between ability
and eﬀort. This more general case is much less tractable, and so only numerical results
comparing appointment to elections can be established. We brieﬂys k e t c ht h i se x t e n s i o n
here. Assume that if i is the incumbent, the project outcome at t, xt is given by
xt = µ(θ
i + et)+( 1− µ)θ
iet + ωt (5.1)
where θ
i is the ability parameter as before, et ∈ [0,∞) his eﬀort level in period t, ω0,ω1
are i.i.d. mean zero random shocks, and ﬁnally µ ∈ [0,1]. Following Dewatripont, Jewitt
13and Tirole, (1999), if µ =1 , eﬀort and ability are additive in production: if µ>1, they are
non-additive (partly multiplicative). In either period, the oﬃce-holder chooses et without
observing ωt.Also, ωt is assumed to have a continuous distribution with probability density
function f, cumulative distribution function F, and has full support on <.
Conceptually, the analysis of appointment and elections is much as before. The learn-
ing eﬀect with appointment can be calculated10 as
V




00 (1 − π2)
dπ2
dx1
fh (x1,e 1)dx (5.2)
where v00 > 0 as before, π2(x1,e 1)=P r ( θ
i = θh |x1,e 1) and is fk (x1,e 1)=f(x1 −
µ(θk + e1)+( 1− µ)θke1),k= h,l. Now, dπ2
dx1 > 0 as long as f satisﬁes11 the monotone
likelihood ratio condition f0
h/fh >f 0
l/fl. In this case, if eﬀort and ability are at least
partly multiplicative (µ<1), then V 0(e1) > 0.
With elections, the unique weakly dominated strategy for voters is to vote for the
incumbent if x1 > ˜ x, and for the challenger if x1 < ˜ x, where ˜ x is the unique value of x1
for which π2(˜ x,eE
1 )=π. So, with elections, there is still a learning eﬀect, but it is now




00 (1 − π2)
dπ2
dx1
fh(x1,e 1)dx < V
0(e1)
which is less than the learning eﬀect with appointment. Added to the learning eﬀect,
however, is a career concerns eﬀect similar to the one identiﬁed above. Numerical simula-
tions, reported in Le Borgne and Lockwood (2000), show that it is possible that eA
1 >e E
1 ,
and also that voter welfare under appointment may be higher.
6. Related Literature and Conclusions
6.1. Related Literature
There are a number of related papers other than those mentioned in the introduction.
First, our results have implications for the very general results obtained by Banks and
Sundaram (1998) on optimal retention in agency problems. They consider a very general
principal-agent model where (i) information about ability is asymmetric, i.e., only known
by the agent, and (ii) the agent can only be controlled by the (credible) threat of ﬁring,
10This is very similar to the formula obtained in Mirman, Samuelson, and Urbano (1993)for the value
of learning to a monopoly seller who is undertain about the demand function.
11The Normal distribution is one case in which this is satisﬁed.
14i.e., non-retention. This model includes almost all12 existing political agency models as
special cases, as well as having many other applications. In this setting, they show that the
ability of the principal to ﬁre the agent unambiguously raises the agent’s eﬀort13. Indeed,
under some very weak regularity conditions, the threat of (electoral) dismissal induces
agents of all types to supply more eﬀort that they would otherwise in their ﬁrst term of
oﬃce (Proposition 3.3). As our model (with their information structure) is a special case
of theirs, our paper shows that this otherwise very general result is not robust to a change
in the information structure.
Second, Persson and Tabellini (2000, Chapter 4.5), have a two-period electoral model
with both adverse selection and moral hazard, where, as in this paper, initially the in-
cumbent does not know his type. In their model, given an incumbent with ability θ, the
technology for supplying the public good is g = θ(τ − r) where g is output of the public
good, τ is exogenous tax revenue, and r are rents misappropriated from tax revenues. So,
having observed g and r at the end of the ﬁrst period, the incumbent can perfectly infer
his productivity. Therefore, learning is complete, whatever the level of rent diversion (or
eﬀort), and so there is no learning eﬀe c t ,a sw eh a v ed e ﬁned it.
Third, there is a link to the “career concerns” literature initiated by Holmstrom’s
classic paper (Holmström (1982, 1999)). This literature makes the same informational
assumptions as us, while the economic model is rather diﬀe r e n t( t h ew a g eo ft h em a n -
ager (incumbent) is endogenous; there is no possibility of being ﬁred). Our information
structure (although not the model of the principal-agent relationship14)i st h es a m ea s
the career concerns literature of Holmström (1982, 1999), and Dewatripont, Jewitt, and
Tirole (1999). This literature - to our knowledge - has not noted the existence of learning
eﬀects. This is because the existing literature assumes either (i) an additive technology,
where information has no value (Holmström, 1982, 1999); (ii) one period only, in which
case information acquired currently cannot be used in the future (Dewatripont et al.,
1999).
12The exception is Coate and Morris(1995), where asymmetric information is two-dimensional: the
incumbent not only privately observes his type, but the type of the public project.
13This follows from Proposition 3.2 of their paper, which shows that the lower bound of the support
of the random eﬀort in the ﬁrst period of the agent’s life is higher than efort in the second (last) period,
when the threat of ﬁring has no force. Given their information strucure, second-period eﬀort is the same
that would be supplied in the ﬁrst period if the principal had no power to ﬁre the agent.
14The career concerns literature focuses on the labour market, not the relationship between the elec-
torate and public oﬃcials. Speciﬁcally, in the career concerns literature, pay of the agent is not exogenous
(as in our model) but depends on the employer’s belief about the marginal/average product of the agent,
and that belief depends in turn on past performance.
15Finally, there is a related paper15 by Swank and Visser(2003), which we saw only after
the ﬁrst version of this paper was complete (LeBorgne and Lockwood(2000)). In their
model, an incumbent has to make two decisions about a discrete project: whether to
design it, and whether to evaluate the beneﬁts (to the voter) of the design. Both these
activities are costly. Voters can precommit to a retrospective voting rule. The main result
is that elections per se do not provide any incentives to agents evaluate projects, only to
design them. So, unlike in our model, eﬀort is two-dimensional. So, in this sense, our
results and theirs are complementary. We show that even if eﬀort is one-dimensional,
elections may not incentivise the agent. They show that with two dimensions, elections
may distort the pattern of eﬀort levels.
6.2. Conclusions
We have shown that when the informational assumptions of the political agency literature
are changed (by supposing that candidates for oﬃce are less than certain about their
abilities), an experimentation motive for choice of eﬀort comes into play. This motive is
weakened by elections, and so if the experimentation motive is strong enough, elections
may demotivate oﬃce-holders (relative to appointment). The intuition behind our results
are, however, more general and applies to other labour markets: as long as the agent has
some positive probability of being “ﬁred” by the principal, that the model is dynamic and
the technology the agent uses is at least partly multiplicative in talent and eﬀort then
both career concerns and experimentation will be present. Extension of the analysis of
this paper to other labour markets is a topic for further work.
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17A. Appendix
A.1. Derivation of eA
1 when c = e2/2
It is easily checked that



















[π2(1)θh +( 1− π2(1))θl]
2 − [π2 (0,e 1)θh +( 1− π2 (0,e 1))θl]
2ª
−δ
π(1 − π)(θh − θl)2
(1 − θe1)
[π2 (0,e 1)θh +( 1− π2 (0,e 1))θl]=0
After straightforward but lengthy simpliﬁcation, available on request, this rearranges to
e1 = θ + δ
π2(1 − π)2(θh − θl)4
2θ(1 − θe1)2
A ss h o w ni nt h em a i nt e x t .
A.2. Example With ∆I ≤ min{0, ∆C}.
Set θl =0 ,π= 1 √
2. Then we have















So, for ∆I ≤ min{0, ∆C}we need only 0 ≤ ∆C. But























Also, π2(0,e 1) is decreasing in e1, and in equilibrium, eE
1 >e ∗ = θ = πθh.S o ,g i v e n
π =1 /
√
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